Can An Atheist Justify Objective Morality?

I was challenged recently to demonstrate why morality is a problem for the worldview of an atheist.

A complicated question to be sure, and I would need to qualify it. First, to me, I begin with the premise that the atheist, in terms of adherence to logical and rational conclusions, is obligated towards a reductionist/materialist worldview. I know not all atheists subscribe to this, but certainly the reductionsit/materialist POV is the basis for most atheist positions and arguments. It is the primary reason why one can appeal to and justify either the soft version (“I have yet to find compelling evidence for God) or the hard version (“There is no evidence for God”).

Second, I would also qualify this by saying, the reason morality is a problem for the atheist intersects with why “morality,” at least in an objective sense, is a problem for any worldview. There is a particular shape that this takes for the atheist, to be sure, but it belongs to that larger discussion.

Less suffering is better than more suffering

Often the foundation of ethics and morality for secular humainists (or other materialst/reductionist views that fall under the atheist umbrella) adheres to this simple mantra- less suffering is better than more suffering. Dig underneath the mix of practical and philosophical approaches found in works from Julia Drivers, Steven Cahn, Sam Harris, Peter Singer, James Rachel Joshua Greene, just to name a few anchored in the likes of Hume, Nietzsche and Kant, and you’ll find some version of this generalized statment.

What is suffering

Suffering is defined as “the state of undergoing pain, distress or injury/hardship.” (Oxford)

It’s a simple statement that doesn’t appear to need any further qualifications. Whatever we build around this doesn’t change the brute nature of the statement, which is rooted in a simple, testable, reliable observation: we know that biological systems seek to avoid pain, and it stands as a basic, logical assumption that less suffering is always better than more. Of course this can apply to personal experiences, but it also applies to the cooperative social systems that different philosophies will say are beneficial to human life and survival.

But is it really that simple?

What is morality and how does it relate to suffering

Let’s begin with the most direct and prominant criticism of such a view, which is that it represents a crude form of morals and ethics. To reduce morals and ethics to simple pain and pleasure paradigms is not only inconsistent in its own premise, it cannot attend for all of the ways in which our experience of this world actually works and functions. In truth, suffering reaches far beyonod simple matters of physical pain, and equally represents many varied equations in which suffering is seen to either be neccessary, welcome, or good. The same person attempting to establish a basic grounds for moral and ethical concern around the brute statement “less suffering is better than more,” is also someone who will insist that pain is a necessary, welcome and good part of the natural order. This seems a given. Which, at the very least, means we are dealing with complex systems that are not reducible to hard and fast rules.

But it doesn’t stop there. That same person will usually add to the premise a further qualification regarding how it is we respond to suffering. This usually follows the recognition that a world without suffering is both impossible and undesirable, thus given it is a brute fact (we suffer), it is also necessary to not only accept suffering as part of life, but to see it as enhancing the experience of life. Typically you find this in the more philosophical works, given that it tends to reflect a blend of function (the pain that we find in the natural order) and construction (suffering that comes from pain makes us better and helps us grow in our experience of it).

Here we begin to confront the inconsistencies, and it is easy to see the line between pain and suffering starting to blur, along with the moral values.

Is suffering good or bad, desired or unwanted, necessary or uneccessary

First off, one of the biggest arguments against theism is the problem of suffering. Which, to restate that in a slightly different way, is a problem because suffering is assumed to be a bad thing. A world with suffering either means God does not exist or God is not good. Why? Because a good God would not submit its creation to suffering and/or would do something about it.

Typically, at least in my experience, the people making this argument are the same ones who would make the argument that a life without suffering and pain would be undesirable and not a good thing. That would be the first contradiction. Now, its possible of course to restrict the problem of suffering to a theological framework, which is to say that it is only a problem IF a good God exists. But I find that to be a bit of a smokecreen. Why would we percieve suffering to be a problem in a world with a (good) God but not in a world without a (good) God? The answer usually follows a line that says well, in a world without a God there is nothing to blame. But one still assumes that suffering is bad and undesirable in that equation, and further, morality and ethics seems to depend on seeing suffering, or least certain suffering, as bad, undesired, or unecesesary.

Thus the inconsistency illuminates the real issue: can we logically sustain a response to suffering that wants to choose when and how to apply it as necessary and good, and when to see it as bad and undesirable? Most of the academic sources that you will find on morals and ethics from a secularist POV will be engaged in this game of selective application. The way around this is to double down on the brute fact as its guiding principle. The problem is, this tends to leave most discussions of morals and ethics operating largely beyond this brute fact.

Why is suffering a problem?

This is where you start to see arguments fluctuating between allegiances to morals and ethics in and of themselves and bringing in appeals to different motivating factors to provide a coherent narrative for these constructed and complex systems. Here in lies one of the problems though. If one adheres to a reductionist/materialist foundation of reality, the only way any emergent or complex property makes sense is within the predictive laws that ground them. In other words, those complex and constructed moral/ethical systems might be a true observation regarding what we find in the world, but their justification, if we indeed seek to justify it, is still bound to the laws and order of nature. This is what I find gets muddled, and indeed often clouded in much of the academic work on this subject.

If suffering is a brute fact, and all responses that label selective suffering as bad are necessarily contextualized within our social constructs (meaning, the existence of suffering itself, or lack thereof, isn’t the true concern of such systems), then what we have is a necessarily dynamic response that is operating without a coherent anchor when placed within the category of our experience.

What are we justifying?

Now, this in and of itself doesn’t mean the existence of morals/ethics can’t be justified within secularist worldviews (it can). It just shifts precisely what is being justified in this case. This is not a justification that morals/ethics are inherently good. It’s not even a justification that morals/ethics are necessary for the survival of the human species. Rather, it is a justificaiton for what the moralal/ethical systems that we find are- emergent properties of the development of humans/human socities as socially aware creatures. And part of this qualification means both pointing out that there is no concrete sense in which given morals/ethics exist in this sense. They are, categorically, products of socal and biological function. This is easy to see and note of course when we actually narrow in on the functional aspects of moral and ethical systems, but the problem is we also see something else- human creatures who live and believe as though morals and ethics do in fact have some proper grounding in objective truth.

The reality of our beliefs

In other words, the typical argument from a secularist vantage point understands morals and ethics to, rationally speaking, be one thing, but it also understands that in order for moral and ethical systems to work people need to believe they are something else. Which is precisely what we find in any fair and reasoned analysis of societies operating from a secularist POV. In truth, there are endless ways and examples in which the former, which must be the voice of authority in this equation, contradicts the latter, which is where we find a framed crisis or moral dilemma emerging.

The atheist could turn around here and say okay, that’s fine, it just is what it is. Our experience can still categorize as real. Which might be true in one sense. The issue surfaces on two fronts however: when this basic function of reality reflects the grounds for ones rejection of their belief in God, it raises the question of why one is motivated to see one belief as necessarily antithetical to reason while the other is not. One fair response to this could be for the atheist to concede that one doesn’t need to see belief in God as anteithetical to reason, it just needs to qualify it in the same terms as things like our adherence to moral and ethical systems. But, and this would be my own assessment and conclusion of course, I have yet to meet an atheist who approaches this idea with any true consistency or coherency. It never takes long to find ones true authority being something other than the former (reductionst/materialist forms of reality), and it is typically some form of the latter (experiences and beliefs) that is holding everything together.

The contradiction of selective suffering

And this isn’t contained to personal experience. Just as we target diseases and look to eradicate them based on deeming them “bad,” we qualify suffering as inherently bad and undesirable. If we could not assume suffering to be bad and undesirable, we would not attend to it, and the reason we attend to it is part of our need to construct meaningful lives, however that gets defined. Which is to say: we need the freedom to name suffering as bad, unwanted, undesired. The problem is, our commitment to a reasoned position based on a reductionaist/materialist POV means taht we are forced to be inconsistent in how we apply this. It would be like trying to justify the eradictation of cancer while similtaneously trying to argue it is necessary or wanted as part of the natural order.

This applies to all manners of commonly held beliefs. We don’t value love on emotional grounds- that would suggest we experience love as a biological function. That doesn’t map on to how people actually experience the world. It doesn’t make sense of the beliefs we hold that allow us to experience the world in ways that redefine it as more than biological function. Sure. we can manipulate biological function, and we do so all the time through the information gained in the field of science or in the natural processes of our interaction with the world. But the reason we do so, at least in terms of our experience, is because we beleive that love is a valued and inherent thing. It is not subjective, meaning we feel free, in our brains, to apply it to the whole of our subjective experiences as an objective and inherent truth or a governing force.

This is what anchors the biological construction in something we might call real. Which is where any point of crisis really arises from. Our brains are wired to solve the cognitive dissonance that occurs between functional realities and our experience of reality. If we understood and genuinely saw reality (or the different componants of reality) as they are and for what they are, within a secularist POV, we wouldn’t be able to function. This is true on the level of physics, but it is also true on the level of the constructed or complex realities that shape our lives. Any emergent or constructed property can be reduced to the same physical components. Our brains are designed to construct reality out of this so as to allow us to comprehend the world, not reeduce it. Which is where many attempt to argue that morals and ethics are in fact necessarily subjective. Subjective doesn’t need to be contained to the individual, it can apply to societies and cultures and communities.

Again, on one level this is fine when it comes to making a rational and coherent argument. The problem is, our actual beliefs don’t follow suit. Pick apart someones life and values (or a society or a culture) and this becomes obvious time and time again. In my experience, atheist arguments often fail to address this simple point- when confronted with reality our brains are designed to defend against it. Which is precisely why we have to be able to name suffering in concrete terms. We can do all the necessary work of reducing it and breaking it down on paper, the simple truth is that when we are actually confronting or experiencing it we do so in ways that reframe it according to our actual beliefs.

If not suffering, than happiness?

Going back to the question about suffering and how we attend to it in largely selective ways, this also betrays the other part of that equation- we not only assume that suffering is bad, we also assume that happiness is the preferred aim. Which brings in a whole other set of problems, and in my opinion this is also a point that I find most atheist arguments simply do not attend for. If our starting point begins on the level of suffering’s brute nature (it exists, and it is both impossible and undesriable to get rid of all suffering and it less suffering is better than more), we then find ourselves in the game of measuring when we deem suffering as unecessary and undesirable and when we don’t. Sometimes this is reduced to that age old hierarchy of needs- suffering is defined as the lack of those base needs such as food, clothing, shelter, relationship. And yet, we also know that once these needs are met there is a whole other part of that hierachy that comes into view. We give a person food. We give a person a home. Then what? This is where a whole other kind of suffering opens up and forces its way into the mix.

When addressing one pain creates new pains

And yes, I have had many an atheist simply dismiss this point out of hand, but I don’t think this can be dismissed that easily. We can apply this same base line of thought to nearly everything that concerns matters of moral/ethical obligation, which again, is a socially imposed construct anchored in biolgical/social function. This is a truism we cannot escape- addressing one pain creates new pains. On a societal level, any societal change that is deemed to be good is similtaneously the grounds for future pains. And on that same level, every single moral and ethical decision one makes in response to perecieved suffering has to be measured in context. The issue being, the only way to do that is to assume some underlying grounds and foundation that can reflect a fixed value or belief across all times and all contexts. This is the part that often gets ignored.

Selective or uniform suffering

If its not clear at this point, where this presses towards is always to say, suffering relative to what? And why are we selecting this suffering here and now to be labeled as bad in relationship to other suffering? These are usually the questions posed to the equation in a hierchal system where moral and ethical constructs are necessarily contextualized. There is always the sense that someone or something has suffered more or less in measure, and yet suffering, to be coherent, also has to be uniform in its nature. Its an experience that expresses itself in the same way regardless of where we find it within that refelected hierachy. This poses a problem to the reductionsit POV, which seeks to systematize moral and ethical obligations and responses within these contextualized realities. Some try and skirt this, usually the token positivist in the crowd, by appealing to the inherent good nature of the human person. We, they say, are simply prone to respond to others when we see suffering. There is no need to distrust this, nor is there need to overcomplicate it. That belongs to the old “you’re placing too much burden on rationalism” rhetorical response, which is an accusation I’ve had lobbied my direction a few times. The problem emerges when one wants to actually attend for the rational argument and critique the beliefs that we find present in the world and underlying and sustaining these systems. If something is shown to be inconsistent in how it maps on to reality, then its fair to say that represents a logical problem.

But of course, rationalism is precisely the basis for ones rejection of particular worldviews. So it seems odd that we can choose when and how it can and must apply to our given beliefs. Perhaps it simply comes down to this: if I encounter someone making concrete statments like “less suffering is better than more suffering,” and I either desire, feel obligated towards, or feel the need to challenge the coherence and truth of that statement, am I not required to test that statment if I want to be rational? I would say yes.

I might even say my desre, obligation, need to test that statement has direct implications for how I live my life. In fact, the statement might be true in some shape or form, but that simply opens the door to other questions, which is to say, to what end must that demand something of me? Does it apply to an inherent responsibility? Or is it simply about wanting to establish integrity between my beliefs and my actions? Again, this opens up all sorts of other problems that only compound the more we realize the degree to which our concern for suffering relates directly to our experience of a meaningful life.

What we think versus what we feel suffering is

To begin, it might be true to point to the presence of certain biological factors that suggest a person in a given social situation who encounters suffering will be compelled to act. But this is not the trustworthy observation that many make it out to be. First, we are restricted in our ability to say someone is good or has done good because they act in a particular fashion, in the same way we are restricted in saying someone is inherently valuable purely on the grounds that they are a person. Second, when the definition of a good person is defined in terms of how we act, either willfully or naturally, this leads directly to moralism. Moralism establishes a social hierachy based on judgement Its central concern is upholding social function, not the inherent value of the person.

Third, one does not need to look far to find represented in our art endless stories of people and societies and communities facing moral and ethical dilemmas on these very terms. Stories about people who failed to act in such a situation. Stories of people who have to make compromising or impossible decisions. The list goes on and on. The question is, why does this dilemma exist? In the above approach it exists because it is imposed by a social structure, one that is based on reductionism/materialism and moralism. To be caught in a space of moral compromise is to have ones worth thrown into question. Even if this doesn’t correlate with anything truly rational or true, we both feel and experience this to be true largely because of social implcations and biological function.

Do we cause more harm than good?

It gets worse though. It is possible for one to live a happy life and to believe one is good while living a life that causes far more suffering than not. Actually, its not just possible, its the most likely description of most lives, if not all. We don’t like to think this way of course, because that would lead to defeatism. Our necessary beliefs would collapse very, very quickly (ironically leading to our suffering). So we emphasize the other side of the equation. In a world full of suffering its about the good that we do. Leaving aside for a second the fact that this brings in unsubstantiated assumptions about what is “good,” here certain logical approaches like effective altruism press back with its commitment to a truly rationalist approach. What something like effective altruism points out is, the good that we do has more to do with how we feel than making any actual difference. It’s not only true that we have no way of knowing how any action we take leads to good outcomes, let alone the best outcomes, its also true that we only have the way it makes us feel- meaningful or worthwhile or purposed. This is precisely why the atheist will protect their beliefs with the same fervor as the religious. In fact, once again, when we look at the most likely conclusion, it can be said that most of what we do creates and experiences far more pain and suffering than anything else. That’s a rational statement. What effective altruism wants to do is find a way to objectively anchor any moral/ethical action to a simple statment- whatever serves the greatest good for the greatest numbers. Good here being defined as less suffering is better than more, and simtaneously more happiness is better than less.

Thus, if we give money to an organization that is ineffective compared to the organization down the road that is objectively more effective, that is by defintion a less than moral act. In this sense, morals and ethics are seen for what they are on purely rational grounds- functional realities that stand external to any allegiance to a will or a self or objective truth. Simple math measuring material outcomes based on the natural order. What brings about the greatest and the most good is the measure. And yes, critics will say that it is impossible to know such a thing, and that such a way of thinking prevents people from doing any good, precisely because it has the appeearance of being an impossible equation and subsequently does not align with how people experience and live in the world. And yet, at the very least, it exposes and highlights the logical problems that do exist in how we view and approach matters of morals and ethics. We don’t need to apply those things on a macro level, we can see it taking effect on a micro level. And one of the biggest things it reveals is the way social systems work. The fact is, most, if not all people will live their lives doing far more harm than good. A very select few who have ability, awareness and influence change the systems people belong to, and the greatest good for the most people is always a question of system. Those who change systems are typically doing so by reorienting the masses in a particular direction subconcsciouslly, unconsciouslly, and unaware. And in all cases, such moral and ethical commmitments requires sacrifrice that, if understood and made aware, would lead to a moral crisis.

Just to reiterate and restate that: in a secularist POV, the only real moral and ethic that applies to the average pereson is the enforceable kind, which tends to get reduced to not causing recognizable physical harm to another. This defines most of human life on planet earth. The way this is upheld is by having our societal portraits of the necessary scapegoat. As long as we have someone or something that enables us to say “we are not them or that,” we can call ourselves good and feel that we are good. This is necessary because suffering and happiness are always existing in relative comparison.

For the greater minority, whatever reason is driving such an action, they will make active decisions to sacrifice one thing for another. This usually arises through some form of contact, influence or awarness. But even then, beyond playing into the false perception that this results in a meaningful or purposed life (again, sacrifice compared to what), those decisions and actions rarely, if ever, bring about actual real change that qualfies as good that we can know. At best, that is restricted to the very small minority who have the capacity and influence to break things down into functional and measurable componants (reductionsism), and whom are able to satisfy and solve the effectiveness of the perecieved needed moral and ethical response on a mathematical level.

Yes, I know I get a lot of pushback on this front. But remember, this is speaking in purely rational terms. It might not feel great to hear and see it in this way, but that doesn’t mean its not true. I would suggest though that even in these cases, such changes by those with the capacity to bring it about are nevertheless still coming face to face with the same problems. History shows that even widespread changes in systems inevitably become the thing that bring about new problems and pains, and typically exist within a world that takes the same sahpe that it always has- Empire (or its ancient form, tribalism). Whatever changes in that system we might find and see, the shape of the world is still the same. That doesn’t change.

What really matters is believing we’ve lived a meaningful life

But it has another problem. If the true moral and ethical discussions belong to the question of constructed systems, what do we do with the lives contained within? This, I am arguing, is where those beliefs become necessary, even where we can say they aren’t rooted in anything true. And this uncovers the push and pull of moral and ethical constructs. What matters to people is ultimately how we feel. Whatever objective measure we might seek beyond that is fueled by this essential componant. And feelings map on to beliefs. These things might change according to that which comes into our field of awareness, but they remain what they are- they serve that part of our self that needs to feel as though we have meaning and purpose. This is part of what it is to be human. In this sense, the truly rational approach to morals and ethics does not matter. Our lack of true defintions does not matter. Our inconsistencies and incoherent narratives does not matter. Whatever our life gets constructed to be controls where and how we relate to that necessary feeling. This becomes more concrete when functional realities (a lack of food or home for example) challenge the construction of our lives. In that case its easy to put all of the other logical demands of our reasoning aside. When we bring in the rest of the hierarchy things get much more problematic. However, what I am arguing here is that regardless, the problem still apply in the same way.

What is the answer?

So what is a possible answer? I might suggest two things. First, for moral and ethical constructs to be rational, we must acknowledge that they are contextualized realites, not authoratative ones. Meaning, they can never act as a source of truth. Here I would say that this applies to any worldview, including the worldview of the theist. What follows from this for the atheist is the equal concession that such constructs. regardless of how we attribute meaning to them, are reduced to their material defintion. This means, the only way to be trutly rational is to accept and state that, in a secularist POV, our beliefs are part of that construct. They play a role, but that role necessarily contradicts the reality of the biological and social  system that it is a product of. Which means, such truth is contained to data, to information regarding a functional system

If those two things are the necessary foundation for our understaanding of moral and ethical systems, the rest of the discussion becomes about the implications of this reality. This is where I think push comes to shove. This is also why my own position is such that I maintain a rejetion of all moral and ethical systems. Which is not to say that I reject morality or ethics, or that I live apart from such things. It is to say that I reject all such constructs as authorative. On this front I adopt the necessary posstion of the cynic. This is also where I would challenge the atheist on the logical front of this question. It would be one thing if the atheist were to adopt that necessary cycnism. It would be quite another for the atheist to apply that. This gets to the crucial point for me in terms of seeing morals and ehics through a different lens. Cynicism can’t remove oneself from a world of constructs and still function according to the way we experience the world as conscious creatures. Unless, that is, they anchor truth in something else. This is really what it comes down to. What I find in most of these debates and argumnets, and indeed in academics, is a need and desire to anchor ones experience of the world in truth. But this truth inevitably just ends up being another construct. Such approaches tend to protect the most important facet of our lives- our experience. The obvious implications here are that such arguments tend to function as their own justification. The reason we are okay with this, or the reason we don’t see this as an affront to logic and reason and our commitment to rationalism, is that what matters most is how our experience connects to the way we feel. Its akin to saying, if we feel our life is meaningful, than our life is meaningful. And moral and ethical constructs play a crucial  and important role in giving us a way to measure that meaning in relationship to how we live in the world. The question then is not whether its possible to feel that way, and thus experience life in this way, its whether we have a basis to logically justify it. We do if objective truth exists. By that I don’t mean the information that defines the construct. I mean truth in the sense that affords the construct a greater authority that it can function as a witness to.

I recognize that I’m wading into waters that has a long and storied history in debates and academics. To this front, this is just my personal assessment born from own studies, experiences and observations. I would maintain that while what I wrote hardly qualifies in the same way, it is my own reflections on that material, which anyone has access to. On my journey, everything that I wrote is what, when I strip away the technical arguments and complex philosophies, what I tend to find in some way, shape or form. And one one last thing on this front. I don’t think that this is some proof of God argument. It’s simply a rational one. It might be true that this world is defined as one in which God exists, that just means the rational argument obligates itself towards certain conclusions. Thats the greater point. If God exists, then I do think there is a way to take those obvservations about the nature of moral and ethical constructs and justify them according to such an appeal to objective truth. The challenge there is to sperate truth from the construct. That would be my objection to certain theistic approaches, which I think have their own penchant for slipping into moralism.