Here is a philosophical idea I have been playing with lately. Mostly in response to questions I have been grappling with and which others have posed to me.
It has to do with how we measure or lay claim to the value of a life. Or perhaps more specifically, the question of a meaningful life. Or what is an ideal life. All three questions get at the same thing.
One of the most oft sentiments I hear is this. A meaningful life depends first on the conviction that less suffering is better than more suffering in a world where some level of suffering is inevitable. This applies most readily to uneccessary suffering.
It depends on secondly on individual liberty, meaning the ability of one to do with their life what they choose.
In the absence of either of these things a meaningful life, or the ability to live a meaningful life, is seen to be compromised.
If that is the foundation, what follows then is the question of contextualizing such a life. When asked what is the ideal life I tend to get two answers from those I am in conversation with. On one hand there is an appeal to a kind of relativism, albeit typically relativism that operates within the parameters and rules of knowledge and reason. On the other hand it seems commonplace that the measure of such value or idealism is dependent on a set number of years. Since the framework that we know today is, to simplify, a lifetime that moves from 0-100, absent of external factors such as suffering we tend to believe that the narrower the gap between life and death is within that given time frame (the reality that we know) the more tragic the loss is. For example, we deem it a greater tragedy that a 12 year old loses their life than an 80 year old.
Chances are that we will also say that both lives hold the same intrinsic value, philosophical quandries that force one to choose between either or aside. And yet, such a measure seems to force us to say at the same time that a life lived 100 years is a more valuable life in terms of its meaningfulness and its pointing to the ideal, creating certain philipshical tensions between the two claims. This tension is particularly relevant to the one posing certain existential demands to life itself.
The measure that we use to make both claims is the same. We measure it based on opportunity lost and opportunity gained , and that opportunity is based on that 0-100 time frame.
So that has me asking the following questions. It is often said by those who oppose religion that the idea of living forever is not attractive. We might desire it in the face of tragedy, but when we really consider it I have had many say to me that most of us wouldn’t want that. A world without death and suffering would be a world absent of life, because death and suffering are the things that allow us to know that we are living.
But is this really the logical conclusion of life and death, or our question of what makes a meaningful life? Let’s consider this. The reason we might think this to be true is because it cannot make sense of our present point of perspective and experience. But what if we rewound to not so many years ago when common life expectancy was 50. Suddenly 50 becomes the ideal.
Or what if we fastforward and imagine a lifespan of 200 where we eradicate certain diseases associated with aging. Would our perspective not change again? And where would we percieve to draw the line in that regard? At some point do we just say enough?
Or what about suffering? If we assume that less suffering is better than more, where do we draw the line when it comes to cancer research, for example? Do we imagine a world absent of suffering only to a certain point? And what do we do with a modern age where technological advancement is almost entirely about conveniences (the absence of certain forms of suffering) rather than necessities? Is that not all given to a matter of perspective as well?
Here is my wondering. I agree with the idea of inherent value. But I think what that demands of us is a similar given statement that recognizes death and suffering as adversaries to life. Without that our logical systems when it comes to the value of life falls apart. And I think that forces us to be honest about the arbitrary lines that we draw that allow us to label death and suffering as necessary to life.
It is no less rational to suggest that to think of the concept of a world absent of death and suffering than it is to rationalize a world with death and suffering. Both force us to appeal to mathers of limited perspective and demand of us a greater imagination when it comes to how we live in a world with death and suffering